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FM THE SITUATION ROOM  
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TOP SECRET SENSITIVE CONTAINS CODEWORD  
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INSTRUCTIONS APPLY

PASS TO BREMER/GOMPERT FOR THE SECRETARY

OCTOBER 31, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR SECRETARY KISSINGER  
FROM: THE SITUATION ROOM  
SUBJECT: INFORMATION ITEMS

EXPULSION OF SOUTH AFRICA VETOED: THE U.S., FRANCE, AND BRITAIN TODAY CAST VETOES IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO BLOCK AN ATTEMPT TO EXPEL SOUTH AFRICA FROM THE UNITED NATIONS. IT WAS THE FIRST TIME IN UN HISTORY THAT THREE NATIONS JOINED IN CASTING VETOES IN THE COUNCIL. IT WAS ALSO THE FIRST TIME A FORMAL PROPOSAL TO EXPEL A MEMBER COUNTRY HAD BEEN PRESENTED TO THE 15-NATION COUNCIL. TEN MEMBERS, INCLUDING AUSTRALIA, VOTED FOR THE RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD HAVE EXPELLED SOUTH AFRICA. AUSTRIA AND COSTA RICA ABSTAINED.

PRESIDENT THIEU FIRES THREE CORPS COMMANDERS: PRESIDENT THIEU RELIEVED THE COMMANDING GENERALS OF MILITARY REGIONS 2, 3, AND 4 ON OCTOBER 30. ALL THREE MEN HAVE BEEN CRITICIZED RECENTLY AS CORRUPT. HE HAS REPLACED THEM WITH THREE YOUNGER GENERALS WHO HAVE REPUTATIONS FOR GREATER PROBITY. THIS IS THE THIRD STEP THIEU HAS TAKEN IN THE LAST WEEK TO DEFUSE CRITICISM OF HIS ADMINISTRATION. HE EARLIER FIRED FOUR CABINET MINISTERS AND ORDERED OVER 300 FIELD GRADE OFFICERS OUT OF THE ARMY BECAUSE OF CHARGES OF CORRUPTION. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL REPORTS THAT THE OPPOSITION WOULD STAGE LARGE-SCALE RALLIES AND DEMONSTRATIONS ON VIETNAM NATIONAL DAY, NOVEMBER 1. THIEU'S MOVES SEEM OBVIOUSLY DESIGNED TO DEFLATE THIS EFFORT.

RABAT: EGYPTIAN PASSIVITY: AVAILABLE REPORTING SUGGESTS THE EGYPTIAN POSITION PRIOR TO AND DURING THE RABAT SUMMIT ANTICIPATED A PLO VICTORY. IN THE WEEKS BEFORE THE MEETING OF ARAB FOREIGN MINISTERS AT RABAT, MESSAGES TO THE USG, GENERALLY CONVEYED BOTH FROM EGYPTIAN AND SAUDI OFFICIALS

CLEARLY SUGGESTED THAT THE EGYPTIANS, AT A MINIMUM, WOULD ACTIVELY SEEK AN ARAB ENDORSEMENT OF

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JORDAN'S RIGHT TO NEGOTIATE FOR THE FUTURE OF THE WEST BANK. WE WERE INFORMED THAT THE GOE WOULD CAMPAIGN AMONG OTHER ARAB STATES FOR SUCH ENDORSEMENT, AND WERE TOLD THAT SADAT'S ENVOY, ASHRAF MARWAN, WAS BEING SENT TO SAUDI ARABIA AND THE GULF TO MEET WITH ARAB LEADERS FOR THIS PURPOSE. DURING THE FOREIGN MINISTERS' CONFERENCE, FAHMI APPARENTLY SPOKE FOR A RESOLUTION OF THE WEST BANK ISSUE IN FAVOR OF JORDAN, WITHOUT SUCCESS. DURING PRIVATE MEETINGS AT THE SUMMIT, HOWEVER, SADAT APPEARS TO HAVE DONE LITTLE MORE THAN WATCH SILENTLY WHILE THE SYRIAN/PLO INITIATIVE RAN ITS COURSE, WITHIN A GENERAL LIMITATION THAT A JORDANIAN NEGOTIATING ROLE SHOULD NOT BE EXCLUDED IN FUTURE SETTLEMENT TALKS. ONE MAY INFER THAT THE EGYPTIANS, HAVING TESTED THE WIND AT THE FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING, SAW LITTLE HOPE OF PREVAILING AND DECIDED TO ADOPT A FALLBACK STANCE OF PASSIVITY. THERE IS SOME EVIDENCE SUGGESTING THIS FALLBACK POSITION WAS DECIDED ON IN ADVANCE OF THE EVENT. FOR EXAMPLE, THE ANNOUNCED ARAB AID FUND FOR THE CONFRONTATION STATES -- INCLUDING JORDAN -- APPEARS TO HAVE BEEN DECIDED ON WITH SINGULAR EASE, AND BEARS ASPECTS OF PREPLANNING. REPORTING THUS FAR INDICATES THE MONEY WILL BE PUT UP BY SAUDI ARABIA, KUWAIT, QATAR, AND THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES (UAE) AMONG OTHERS. PERHAPS MORE THAN COINCIDENTALLY, ASHRAF MARWAN'S TRIP PRIOR TO THE CONFERENCE INCLUDED SAUDI ARABIA AND THE UAE, WHILE AT APPROXIMATELY THE SAME TIME, THE EMIR OF KUWAIT WAS IN CAIRO. IF, IN FACT, MARWAN WAS DISPATCHED TO WORK OUT THE DETAILS OF A FUND WHICH, WHILE PROVIDING EGYPT WITH A VASTLY INCREASED ARAB SUBSIDY, WOULD ALSO IN EFFECT COMPENSATE JORDAN IN CASE OF A PLO VICTORY AT RABAT, IT MAY BE INFERRED THAT THE EGYPTIANS BELIEVED SUCH A VICTORY TO BE A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY AND THEY WOULD HAVE TO SUPPORT IT. ACCORDING TO THE ABOVE ANALYSIS, EGYPT ANTICIPATED THAT AT RABAT SHE WOULD HAVE TO FOLLOW RATHER THAN LEAD AND PREPARED HERSELF FOR THE EVENT. IF THIS IS CORRECT, A QUESTION REMAINS AS TO THE IMPLICATION OF RABAT FOR FUTURE EGYPTIAN POLICIES: IT MAY BE SUGGESTED THAT HAVING DEFERRED TO ARAB CONSENSUS ONCE, SHE WILL DO SO AGAIN, AND THAT HER ABILITY TO TAKE ACTIONS WITHOUT THE CONCURRENCE OF EITHER THE SYRIANS OR THE PLO OR KING FAYSAL -- WHOSE VIEWS SADAT MUST INCORPORATE IN HIS STRATEGY PLANNING -- WILL BE EVEN MORE STRICTLY LIMITED. (HOUGHTON)

~~GUYANA-REYNOLDS-USG BAUXITE CONTROVERSY HEIGHTENS: A LAST-DITCH EFFORT TO COOL EMOTIONS AND HEAD OFF THE COLLISION COURSE BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF GUYANA AND REYNOLDS COMPANY BY ARRANGING HIGH-LEVEL GOVERNMENT-COMPANY TALKS MAY BE AGREED UPON.~~

PRIME MINISTER BURNHAM HAS REPORTEDLY AGREED TO GUARANTEE THE PERSONAL SAFETY OF AND FREEDOM FROM ARREST FOR A HIGH COMPANY OFFICIAL TO COME TO GUYANA FOR TALKS. THE ATMOSPHERE OF HOSTILITY WAS HEIGHTENED BY PRIME MINISTER BURNHAM'S BLAS AT THE COMPANY AND THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AT A PUBLIC RALLY LAST SUNDAY IN AN EFFORT TO DRUM UP SUPPORT FOR HIS GOVERNMENT'S RETROACTIVE BAUXITE LEVY AND PLANNED NATIONALIZATION OF REYNOLDS. HE WARNED OF ALLEGED U.S. INTENTIONS TO INTERVENE ON BEHALF OF THE COMPANY AND TO PRESSURE GUYANA BY CUTTING OFF ALL AID AND BY URGING THE WORLD BANK NOT TO MAKE LOANS TO IT. BURNHAM LABELED THE U.S. GOVERNMENT AS GUYANA'S MAIN ENEMY. THIS IS THE STRONGEST PUBLIC ATTACK YET BY A HIGH LEVEL GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN AND IS CLEARLY GAUGED TO SOLIDIFY NATIONALISTIC SUPPORT BEHIND THE GOVERNMENT, POSSIBLY TO TAKE STEPS TOWARD ONE-PARTY RULE. ACCORDING TO THE EMBASSY, PUBLIC REACTION TO BURNHAM'S SPEECH WAS APPROVING BUT UNEXCITED. FOLLOWING ITS REFUAL TO PAY A RETROACTIVE TAX LEVY WHILE STILL FACED WITH CERTAIN NATIONALIZATION BY THE END OF THIS YEAR, REYNOLDS' EXPORTS HAVE BEEN RESTRICTED. REYNOLDS HAS RECENTLY FURLOUGHED ABOUT 40 PERCENT OF ITS WORK FORCE, A MOVE INTERPRETED BY GUYANA AS AN EFFORT TO BRING PRESSURE AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT. OUR EMBASSY DOES NOT BELIEVE THE PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESSFULLY COOLING THE SITUATION ARE ENCOURAGING BUT THINKS THE EFFORT TO DO SO SHOULD BE MADE. (LOW)

VENEZUELA-NORTH KOREA: THE VENEZUELAN GOVERNMENT HAS ANNOUNCED THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH NORTH KOREA. APPARENTLY AT LEAST FOR SOME TIME THERE ARE NO PLANS FOR RESIDENT DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN EITHER CAPITAL, AND VENEZUELA'S RELATIONS WITH SOUTH KOREA WILL NOT BE ALTERED. VENEZUELA HAS PUBLICLY ASSUMED A POLICY OF WISHING TO ESTABLISH DIPLOMATIC TIES WITH ALL NATIONS. NORTH KOREA'S RECENT RELEASE FROM JAIL OF A VENEZUELAN PBHT MADE THE ESTABLISHMENT OF TIES ESSENTIALLY INEVITABLE. (LOW)